This Article seeks to begin to define a role for cities and their inhabitants in climate change governance. Part I argues that if there is a failure to take into account global urbanization and its defining characteristics, namely extreme squalor and associated social ills, as a central feature of climate change policy, we face a future where cities will experience sustained and perhaps intractable urban violence and social disintegration, a development that can only hasten the separate but related harms caused by climate change on the world's human and biological populations. Part II explores some of the consequences of the inattention of the climate change literature, and especially the mainstream U.S.-based legal scholarship on climate change, to incorporate a voice for the world's megacities and their extensive mega-slums in climate change governance. Part III then outlines some of the normative advantages of city-inclusive governance in the context of climate change regulation. Finally, Part IV outlines possible solutions to address the concerns addressed in the previous parts, suggesting ways in which climate change debate and the search for legal solutions to help combat the phenomenon might take account of global urbanization
INTRODUCTION
The effects of climate change on the world's cities and the people who live in them are not subjects that have received a great deal of attention, at least not in isolation from other climate change effects. Climate change effects tend to get considered in continental or regional terms: melting ice caps, agricultural crop losses across vast swaths of land, and shoreline loss that will inundate sub-continents. 1 Alternately, the discussion tends to focus on behavioral change, again at the level of entire national populations, suggesting that countries must consider using cleaner energy sources, producing cleaner-burning vehicles, and providing incentives for citizens to insulate their homes better.
2 Many, if not most, commentators seem to endorse the view that resolution of climate change challenges should be addressed at the global level and enforced by state parties pursuant to global accords. 3 More recently, there has been some discussion of the inequalities that climate change will exacerbate. Crudely put, the analysis posits that poorer nations, especially those in Asia and Africa, will become poorer, [Vol. XXXVI terms, it is impossible to understate the significance of this phenomenon, especially inasmuch as the vast majority of these urban immigrants will arrive with few resources and live in slum conditions. 8 Moreover, perhaps the characteristic feature of many such slums is that they are dominated by the informal economy, characterized by oppressive systems of patronage, corruption, and violence. 9 As the world gets hotter, this seems likely to create a-perhaps literally-combustible situation. 10 A host of factors, including environmental degradation, inadequate provision of environmental and infrastructure services, and limited employment opportunities are combining to turn many of the world's mega-slums into dangerous, violent places.
11 Moreover, there is considerable literature that has examined the relationship between increased urban violence and temperature rise. It is expected to increase by another 1.8° C to 4° C by the year 2100-a rapid and profound change-should the necessary action not be taken. Even if the minimum predicted increase takes place, it will be larger than any century-long trend in the last 10,000 years.").
11. A prominent researcher exploring the relationship between environmental scarcity, environmental crises, and violence is the Canadian social scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon. Although his work does not address climate change specifically, it does explore the relationship of environmental pressures and violence, including urban violence. does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to posit a connection between climate change and urban violence, one that calls for attention to the role of cities in resolving the adverse effects of climate change. This Article does not (because it cannot) presume to establish as an empirical matter that climate change is a cause of urban violence. Rather, the connection between urban violence and climate change provides the point of departure for this Article. That is, in light of the empirical work establishing a connection between urban violence and both environmental scarcity and temperature rise, this Article proceeds on the assumption that as an environmental pressure (perhaps the greatest environmental pressure), climate change can only exacerbate these phenomena. In light of this connection and its serious social and economic consequences, this Article seeks, therefore, to begin to define a role for cities and their inhabitants in climate change governance. Part I argues that if we fail to take into account global urbanization and its defining characteristics, namely extreme squalor and associated social ills, as a central feature of climate change policy, we face, as a Rio de Janeiro taxi driver said to me during the hot, dry, violent winter of 2006 in that city, 13 "um futuro bandido," literally "a bandit future." That is, we face a future where cities, the places where most of the world's population lives, will experience sustained and perhaps intractable urban violence and social disintegration, a development that can only hasten the separate but related harms caused by in the United States, "annual temperatures were associated with assault but not murder rates in analyses that controlled for yearly population, ethnicity, and three economic variables" [Vol. XXXVI climate change on the world's human and biological populations. Part I also explains that the term "cities" does not refer only-or even primarily-to elected or appointed municipal governments. Rather, Part I endorses an expansive understanding of cities to include both metropolitan areas on the official grid and also the shantytowns and slums, the expansive informal and extra-legal settlements that define urban living for millions the world over. Part II explores some of the consequences of the inattention of the climate change literature, and especially the mainstream U.S.-based legal scholarship on climate change, to incorporate a voice for the world's megacities and their extensive mega-slums in climate change governance. In particular, Part II argues that the failure to incorporate a voice for cities reinforces existing and seemingly intractable divisions in international efforts to resolve climate change. Thus, elites with carbon-consumptive behaviors in "developing" countries can hide behind their nations' demands for reductions in "developed" countries, while, conversely, responsible actors in "developed" countries get grouped together with the carbon-consumptive habits of their economic betters. Part II therefore suggests that the presence of voices representing urban populations would help reveal some of the self-interest on all sides and redirect climate change law and policy towards the implementation of more equitable solutions.
Part III then outlines some of the normative advantages of city-inclusive governance in the context of climate change regulation. Part III thus suggests how incorporating voices from cities in climate change governance will serve the larger goals of climate change regulation, including emissions reductions strategies and particularly the goal of adaptive management. Finally, Part IV outlines possible solutions to address the concerns addressed in the previous parts, suggesting ways in which climate change debate and the search for legal solutions to help combat the phenomenon might take account of global urbanization. Specifically, Part IV suggests ways in which a voice for cities, and in particular those urban residents usually without voices-in local or national, much less international forums-may be heard, and their views taken into account in reversing the negative effects of climate change.
I. CITIES, SHANTYTOWNS, AND EXTRA-LEGAL SETTLEMENTS
This Part seeks to establish the value of cities, or portions of them, as actors in the resolution of global climate change problems. First and most evidently, cities merit such a role because of their established strengths as
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OUR BANDIT FUTURE? 217 centers of innovation and wealth. 14 Cities are also, however, centers of inequality: it is this feature of modern cities that may be as important to addressing climate change as their more positive aspects, given that in reality poor urban areas are anticipated disproportionately to suffer the effects of global warming and associated ills.
15 It may also be observed that city residents are especially concerned with climate change, in light of the dizzying profusion of local initiatives to address climate change. 16 [Vol. XXXVI in the United States, the federal government appears to object to this phenomenon; attempts are underway to silence local efforts to respond to climate change, even in the face of federal inaction.
17

A. The Neglect of Cities
The neglect of cities in international climate change debates and, in particular, in U.S. legal scholarship addressing climate change is not entirely surprising. As Gerald Frug noted in a classic piece nearly three decades ago, cities have largely been rendered powerless in U.S. legal discourse and practice. Frug noted the paradox that our "highly urbanized country has chosen to have powerless cities, and that this choice has largely been made through legal doctrine."
18 Frug further noted another paradoxical development: "Not only are cities unable to exercise general governmental governments, and the federal government, to enact policies and programs to meet or beat Kyoto Protocol targets suggested for the U.S.; and urge the U.S. Congress to establish a national emission trading system); CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK (2007), http://home2.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/full_report.pdf (containing, in part, New York City's plan to reduce global warming emissions by more than 30%); TO- RONTO In the context of global climate change debates, Frug's observation is instructive: in climate change, corporate interests are among those recognized as having a stake in resolving the problem, while cities are not. The corporate interest is often included because it is modified by the adjective "multinational," as if the mere fact of doing cross-boundary business merits inclusion with governmental stakeholders. At the same time, corporate interests are also included because they are "sectoral." That is, they represent manufacturers, industries, and features of modern life that have helped create the problem. Yet, as was the case when Frug wrote about the legal place of U.S. cities, in global climate change cities are not recognized as meriting similar influence and a seat at the table. This is true despite their being home to the majority of the world's population.
Frug's analysis of this private/public divide, and its privileging of private interests, helps illuminate the relative exclusion today-in a different context and nearly thirty years later-of city voices in climate change debates. That is, the exclusion of cities from a central place at the table in climate change discussions may be said to occur because of a fundamental distrust of them. As Frug noted of U.S. cities:
there is a widespread belief that although cities are supposed to protect the public interest, they cannot really be trusted to do so. This distrust engenders support for state and federal control of cities to prevent local abuse of power, curb local selfishness, or correct the inefficiencies resulting from "balkanized" local decisionmaking. City discretion of any kind evokes images of corruption, patronage, and even foolishness. This sense of necessity and desirability has made local powerlessness part of our definition of modern society, so that decentralization of power appears to be a nostalgic memory of an era gone forever or a dream of romantics who fail to understand the world as it really is.
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Many of these arguments, albeit in softer, less caustic form, are typical of the objections to local involvement in global climate change debates, where uniformity and efficiency become the watchwords to guard against a "patchwork" of competing and inconsistent local initiatives. 21 To be sure, the limitation of the power of cities, and particularly of popular representation within cities, may derive from different root causes. In the United States, Frug argued that cities were disempowered to promote private commercial interests. 25 In less developed countries, in contrast, this may be done as an imperative of development aid that refuses to wait for the cumbersome process of local decision-making, 26 while land use decisions in other countries may have been consolidated at the national level in order to secure power of ruling political elites. 27 Added to this reality, in much of the world, the populations of large areas of cities exist unheard, use, in environmental regulation of complicated issues such as global warming, of multilayered regulation as "dynamic" and positive); David E. Yet elsewhere, customary, heterogeneous land use practices may interfere with the ability of either the government-national, state, or local-or the private market to express itself, so that customary systems co-exist, albeit uncomfortably, with the private market and governmental regulations. 29 In sum, however, the result is a silencing of local voices.
B. Defining Interests Within Cities
This begs the question, what "city," exactly, would be given a voice if we were to craft a participatory role for urban populations in the climate change debates? As noted at the outset of this Article, a majority of the world's population now lives in cities, most of them in conditions of distress-from moderate to extreme poverty. 30 An additional feature of much of this land occupation is that it can be characterized as extra-legal. That is, vast swaths of the slum settlements that constitute the living conditions of the world's majority exist outside of the formal state in which they exist. In practical terms, this can refer to those millions who live in cities without access to municipal services like roads, water, and sewage, 31 and also for those who live in areas within cities controlled by violent criminal enterprises such that the areas are off-limits to the police, other public safety, and municipal services. 32 This reality should give pause to those making climate policy at the national and international level; the views of significant portions of the global population may not be given voice at those decision making levels. 33 Surely good public policy and effective legislation for climate change-or any issue of import-must take into account the 28 [W] e find that an average of 40 per cent and in some cases as much as 70 per cent of the population of the major cities are living in illegal conditions."); see also supra note 6. views of those it seeks to help and whose behavior it will regulate. 34 At the same time, identifying appropriate representatives of those populations will be no easy task.
Consequently, official, legal governments cannot necessarily be understood to represent urban populations the world over. For many, the rule of law shapes daily life in only the most formal sense. 35 Therefore, some more pluralist model must be adopted to introduce urban voices-whether characterized as "local," "municipal," or "city" representatives-at the climate change policy roundtable. The fact that so much of the world's population remains effectively disenfranchised from the policy decisions that affect them indicates that all of us must demand a search for a more inclusive governance model, one that applies participatory as well as representative democratic principles to climate change governance. 36 In short, this is to advocate consideration of a pluralist model to reshape climate change governance.
Legal pluralism recognizes the diversity of existing judicial systems, often within the same society. Although pluralism does not necessarily maintain that all such orders are normatively justified (or justifiable), pluralism does, at a minimum, support a view like the following: I recognize the existence of a non-state legal order and also understand that this order may contradict the moral or political values of the larger political and social order where it is located. 37 Initially, legal anthropologists and sociologists turned to pluralism to defend the legal and social orders of indigenous and traditional communities. 38 More recently, legal pluralism has been used to defend the interests of what might be called the "urban disenfranchised"- 35. See, e.g., Perdomo & Bolívar, supra note 32, at 127 ("[T]he legality/illegality dualism presupposes the existence of an ordered society in which the rule of law prevails and in which both citizens and government acknowledge their responsibility to observe or to ensure the observance of legal norms."); see also Sérgio de Azevedo, Law and the Future of Urban Management in the Third World Metropolis, in ILLEGAL CITIES, supra note 24, at 258, 261 ("In the complex and rapidly changing societies of most developing countries, political participation cannot be limited to traditional institutional channels of representation (the right to elect and to stand for election). It requires other, more direct, forms of democracy for citizenship rights to be fully realized, especially at the local level. In short, the management of public affairs is too important to be left to the government.").
36. de Sousa Santos & Avritzer, supra note 34, at lxvi (insisting on "new complementarities" between participatory and representative democracy).
37. 
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that is, the urban poor of so many of the world's largest cities. 39 Interestingly, some research suggests that the legal orders observed and implemented in such communities often mirror the practices of the larger society (for example, in establishing land title and developing systems to mediate land conflicts). 40 A pluralist framework offers a mechanism to identify concurrent legal or social orders within nation-states.
In the climate change context, a pluralist model would permit urban interests to be identified and brought to climate change discussion. A powerful advantage of using such a model would be to help refocus the climate change debate away from the "developed" versus "developing" country distinction.
41 Such an effort would incorporate into climate change analysis and discussion not only questions of inequality between states but also inequality within states, comparing the behaviors of those who do not have and consume little within given countries against those who have and consume in those same countries. This will likely have the effect of demonstrating how the "haves" in the developing countries benefit from this inequality, revealing their role in producing climate change, while also identifying similar interests among the global poor, whether in "developed" or "developing" countries, including the heightened risks that the global poor face from climate change, a fact that has been extensively documented. 42 A likely consequence of thus redefining the appropriate parties in climate change discussions would be to deepen our understanding of the challenges of successful climate policy change in the mega-urban centers where most people now live, and where they are projected to continue to concentrate.
Such an approach may be justified on several grounds. First and most obviously, it would satisfy the commitment to equitable solutions articulated in the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 43 More concretely, it could reinforce another central objective of the Framework Convention: namely the desire to reduce both anthropogenic carbon emissions 39 . Article 3(1) articulates a commitment equity to "protect the climate system". Article 3(3) creates a duty of "taking into account different socio-economic contexts" and to "comprise all economic sectors" in defining policies and measures to address climate change. FORDHAM URB. L.J.
[Vol. XXXVI and poverty. 44 The voices of unrepresented parties in climate change governance can presumably speak more eloquently to what is needed to improve their quality of life, while also implementing strategies to reduce the effects of global warming than can their official representatives.
In addition, there are positive social utilities to incorporating a voice for cities at the table of climate change governance. First, there are significant spillover effects from the limited regulation of slums and shantytowns; the better-to-do cannot insulate themselves from the violence and other social and environmental ills produced by their less well-off neighbors. 45 Indeed, it appears that when the better-to-do try to insulate themselves, by, for example, choosing "to meet their housing needs in enclosed condominium developments connected to the central areas via motorways, light rail or metro systems,"
46 their actions serve only to increase urban sprawl and its negative consequences for climate change, such as an increase in impermeable surfaces and vehicle miles traveled. 47 Bringing disenfranchised representatives of urban populations to the table in climate change negotiations might promote workable solutions that take account of the lives led by many of the world's urban residents. On climate-related issues such as 44 . The Preamble to the UNFCC affirms, among other things, "that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty . . . ." See also id. art. 4(7).
45. For example, in Brazil, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, in cooperation with other investors, engaged in remediation problems for important water resources in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the country's two largest cities. Both the River Tietê, in São Paulo, and the Bay of Guanabara, in Rio de Janeiro, had been seriously polluted by unregulated industrial and sewage discharges-the latter largely coming from the shantytowns, or favelas, that surround the cities. This assumes that the interests and perspectives of governments and their representatives, like those of the carbon-producing industries within their borders, may diverge from those of the world's urban poor. 49 This further assumes that, in the long-term, solutions will not be workable unless developed and supported by all sectors of national populations. In fact, the "search for broader economic and political solutions" is often impeded by mistrust or lack of familiarity between the urban poor, and the social and economic actors responsible for the operation of the formal state and economy. 50 Incorporating such urban voices in climate change governance can lead to more efficient solutions. Including a wider range of urban voices in the process of formulating climate change policy may force serious discussion, for example, about densification in planning (and how to achieve it), rather than continued toleration of the climate-negative effects of urban sprawl. This would be possible because the broader model of participation envisaged here would result in a vigorous discussion among all social and economic actors. A collateral benefit of broader participation is that it would highlight internal differences within societies that could only help sharpen the tools with which climate change is addressed. 51 For example, in international negotiations, China and India have been among the loudest "developing" nation voices insisting that "developed" nations should not be allowed to inhibit their carbon emissions until they reached a comparable stage of development, even as their carbon emissions soared. 52 However, 48 . See UNFCC, supra note 43, art. 4(1)(c) (mentioning transportation planning requirements); see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 10(b)(i), Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (creating transportation and spatial planning commitments).
49. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 50. Azevedo, supra note 35, at 262. Azevedo acknowledges that because of urban violence, the tendency of the middle class is to physically isolate themselves from the poor, and that: the middle class reaction is an understandable response to the rise in urban crime and violence. However, the habit of regarding the 'other' (from a lower social group) as a potential enemy tends to reinforce ideological prejudices in the elite, undermining the search for broader economic and political solutions such as a reduction in the amount of absolute poverty . . . .
Id.
51 [Vol. XXXVI such emissions come at a cost, typically for the most politically, socially and economically disenfranchised members of those societies. 53 At the same time, the elites in those societies typically demonstrate the most carbon-consumptive behaviors of their brethren in "developed" societies. Conversely, as the proliferation of climate change policies from U.S. cities reflects, there are significant constituencies in some localities concerned to reduce their carbon footprint. 54 Inserting local voices into climate change negotiations would likely make these internal differences more evident. Thus, it would be possible to craft responses that recognize the behaviors and needs of entire populations rather than narrow segments of individual societies.
At present, however, such a discussion is difficult. The structure of climate change discussions effectively blocks local voices.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF NOT HEARING FROM CITIES IN CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE
In much U.S. legal scholarship and policy analysis of climate change, climate change conflicts tend to be addressed as matters that can be resolved along one of three axes: among nations (multi-lateral discussions among global legal institutions), between two nations (bilateral), and between a national government and its states or other administrative units (intra-national). In addition, because many, if not most, analysts tend to view climate change as an economic problem that can be addressed in part by the law and not as an environmental problem with economic and social causes that can be addressed in part with legal solutions, much U.S. writing tends to reject the most popular proposals to address climate change as politically impractical, unpalatable, and/or unfair to the United States. 55 Even when analysts avow an interest in resolving the seriousness of climate change, 56 Their analysis of the deficits of cross-national efforts to resolve climate change is fairly typical in two respects: (a) its conclusion that most such solutions are deeply unfair to some national actors, notably the United States; 57 and (b) in its assumption that the most promising solutions for climate change are economic in nature, specifically either a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. 58 Although they assert that it is not their intention "to sketch a positive approach to climate change," 59 the net consequence of their analysis serves to inhibit any efforts to resolve climate change problems bilaterally or multilaterally. Posner and Sunstein do appear to believe that the United States has erred in not entering into global climate change commitments. 60 In fact, they believe that some mixture of welfarist or other policies probably should be adopted with respect to climate change. 61 Nonetheless, their analysis of the principal justifications, and notably the distributive and corrective justice defenses, for climate change policy, by failing to push for workable solutions to climate change, could also well have the result of encouraging continued inaction.
Posner and Sunstein begin by likening the threat of climate change to that of an asteroid hitting the earth:
[A]ssume that all nations are threatened by [ [Vol. XXXVI change action are, at best, "highly imperfect" 64 and "crude arguments" (because they do not appeal to any compelling national interest) at worst. 65 The distributional justice argument, in basic outline, goes something like this: because climate change is a global problem with disproportionate effects on poorer regions of the world, it behooves the world's richer nations (which also happen to be some of the more heavily-polluting) to invest more in solving the problem. 66 Posner and Sunstein reject this because, they argue, "[i]t is not at all clear that [redistribution] should take the particular form of a deal in which the United States joins an agreement that is not in its interest."
67 They further maintain that distributional justice to address climate change, either by way of income transfer by rich nations to poor nations or heavy emission reductions limits of richer countries, simply does not make (economic) sense: "purely as an instrument of redistribution, emissions reductions on the part of the United States are quite crude." 68 Why? Because, they continue, "there is a highly imperfect connection between distributive goals on the one hand and requiring wealthy countries to pay for emissions reductions on the other."
69 Thus, they quite simply are not convinced that a compelling justification can be identified for the application of distributive justice principles to combating climate change on a global scale. They acknowledge as follows:
[I]t is quite possible that 100X is better spent on malaria nets and AIDS drugs than on global emissions control, if the only goal is to help the poor. To be sure, it may be that, in fact, the best way to spend X is to cut greenhouse gas emissions. It is possible, for example, that more lives are saved from cutting greenhouse gas emissions than from distributing malaria nets and AIDS drugs, given a constant amount of money and taking into account that future lives and current lives must be put on a common metric. We cannot exclude this possibility, but we can say that the match between greenhouse gas reductions and distributive justice is quite crude.
70
Posner and Sunstein further buttress their arguments with counterarguments, only to shoot them down in short order. They continue to explain, for example, that choosing to cut greenhouse emissions instead of giving direct aid "might be counted as a virtue because the governments of 64 
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many poor states are either inefficient or corrupt (or both)," 71 a reason that many programs transferring aid from developed to developing nations have failed to succeed. By this logic, cutting greenhouse emissions-likely by means of cap-and-trade programs or a carbon tax-would be preferred to any other form of aid. Yet, once again, for various reasons, including the uncertain future payoff of present action and the possibility of corruption in the distribution of carbon-reduction permits, the moral appeal of distributive justifications for climate policy are suspect for them. 72 The tautological character of these arguments merit attention: foreign aid (nation to nation) tends-they say-to fall into the wrong hands, and, even though aid to help address some of the health side effects of climate and environmental change merits our compassion, moral sentiment should not guide us because it will just be diverted by corruption. 73 Therefore, Posner and Sunstein's analysis implies, we should take our hearts off our sleeves, forget poverty reduction and pursue (it is suggested, if not stated) those solutions to global problems like climate change in our national (and perhaps common) economic interest. Quietly and efficiently, their analysis thus pushes redistributive claims to the side. Therefore, in short, distributive justice proves for them intellectually flabby-at least as a justification for multilateral resolution of climate change problems.
Corrective justice arguments are similarly unavailing for Posner and Sunstein. As they explain, "[c]orrective justice arguments are backwardlooking, focused on wrongful behavior that occurred in the past."
74 This is the argument typically advanced by countries with developing economies undergoing spectacular industrial growth, like China and India: despite their new status as heavy greenhouse gas emitters, the nations first to industrialize, they say, bear more responsibility now because of their historical contribution to the problem. Although they acknowledge that the corrective justice problem is "lamentably complex," Posner and Sunstein maintain that:
"The most general point, summarizing the argument as a whole, is that the climate change problem poorly fits the corrective justice model, because the consequence of tort-like thinking would be to force many people who have not acted wrongfully to provide a remedy to many people who have [Vol. XXXVI That is to say, for example, that an environmentally conscious North American, who lives in a small apartment, takes the bus or rides her bike to work, and generally adopts behaviors designed to reduce her carbon footprint should not be required to shift assets (in the form of taxes that would then be transferred as financial assistance from the United States) to a country like India, where a newly rich titan of industry, living in an enormous mansion and getting around in fancy, gas-guzzling imported sports cars, is significantly contributing to the problem, at least as judged individually. Thus, application of corrective justice principles is for Posner and Sunstein a dead end:
The basic problem for corrective justice is that dead wrongdoers cannot be punished or held responsible for their behavior, or forced to compensate those they have harmed. At first glance, holding Americans today responsible for the activities of their ancestors is not fair or reasonable on corrective justice grounds, because current Americans are not the relevant wrongdoers; they are not responsible for the harm.
76
This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for them to endorse corrective justice as a justification for climate change policy and response: such justifications rely heavily upon "notions of collective responsibility that are not easy to defend." 77 Certainly if one analyzes climate change problems as matters for state resolution by use of corrective justice to effect economic redistribution at an international scale, this may be true.
Posner and Sunstein maintain that their goal "has been to clarify the uses and limits" of distributional and corrective justice arguments, "in a way that might bear not only on climate change, but also on a wide range of other questions raised when some nations make claims on others. 
common with the elite in Washington, D.C., London, or Frankfurt, just as the most economically and socially disadvantaged members of each of those places has more in common with their counterparts 79. It should be stressed that this criticism relies upon the conclusion that the limitations of their argument are typical rather than unique. Richard Stewart and Jonathan Wiener, for example, similarly favor entry of the United States into multilateral climate agreements yet note, with some sympathy, the reasons U.S. interests object to doing so. See Stewart & Wiener, supra note 3, at 51-52 (observing that "the advantages and disadvantages of joining the Kyoto Protocol 'as is' appear to us to be fairly closely balanced").
80. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 56, at 1584-85. The authors note that: If resources should be redistributed from rich to poor on the ground that redistribution would increase overall welfare or promote fairness, the intuition appears sound. But there is an immediate problem: If redistribution from rich nations to poor nations is generally desirable, it is not at all clear that it should take the particular form of a deal in which the United States joins an agreement that is not in its interest. Other things being equal, the more sensible kind of redistribution would be a cash transfer, so that poor nations can use the money as they see fit. Perhaps India would prefer to spend the money on education, or on AIDS prevention, or on health care generally. 
III. REFOCUSING THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE AND NORM ARTICULATION BY CITY VOICES
Focusing on the behaviors and necessities of the urban poor across the world's cities may help clarify the most appropriate mechanisms to arrest climate change for at least three reasons. First, the slums of major cities concentrate populations and thus common interests and needs. Second, by virtue of this concentration, the urban environments where most people live literally can be hothouses, both in temperature and social condition, that bring into focus the problems that most merit attention. Third, such focus will redirect attention to urban land uses. Land use practices represent the second-largest challenge in addressing climate change, yet are usually understood only in terms of agriculture and forestry uses, . 82 Surely urban land use merits inclusion in this category as well, demanding our attention to the ways in which land is used, and by whom, in the dominant form of human habitation today.
Because the shape of cities is a land use issue, we should give special attention to the mechanisms of growth in the world's cities. Furthermore, as already noted, because many of the world's urban residents are not effectively represented in urban decision making, there is urgency to identify more participatory mechanisms to assure that the voices of more urban residents are incorporated into this process. 
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heard and the justifications for listening to them as opposed to more localized voices.
A. Who Is Heard in Climate Change Discussions
One is hard-pressed to find U.S. climate change analysts who focus on urban groups, especially the poor who constitute the majority of the world's urban population. In addition to global political institutions and national governments, analysts note the roles of "multinational corporate" interests in the definition of new "assumptive frameworks" about energy sources and supplies. 83 The perspectives of non-governmental organizations also merit consideration. 84 There is also a pronounced sectoral analysis from those who believe that we should focus first on responses among industrial and economic "sectors" (the manufacturing sector, the transportation sector, and the energy sector), 85 either in the first instance or as part of an "integrated" strategy that includes bilateral and multilateral responses.
86
There are also many who argue that state (that is, intra-national) administrative units should have primacy over national (and in the case of the United States, at least, federal) government control. 87 At the international and national levels, it is argued that for the purpose of uniformity, national actors are better equipped than smaller political and administrative units to prevent the proverbial "race to the bottom." 88 Thus, in global climate change matters, the subsidiarity principle, which dictates that the smallest possible administrative unit should be used to resolve problems, is found wanting:
[T]he traditional arguments for decentralization of authority over local drinking water, land use, and the like do not apply with equivalent force. Under the principle of subsidiarity, the global nature of climate change would counsel greater centralization of policy decisions into national, if 83 
89
A basic problem represented by such conclusions, however, is that neither government and industry, 90 nor "environmentalists" 91 may represent the interests of most of the world's overwhelmingly poor and increasingly urban population. For this reason, the notion that the subsidiarity principle only allows global responses turns the principle on its head.
Some proposals reflect an attempt to account for inter-and intra-national difference, such as the "integrated multi-track" proposal advocated by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change. 92 Clearly, there are administrative advantages to such approaches, not least the likelihood of securing reciprocal commitments and uniform, predictable results.
93
In contrast, concerns proliferate about localized decision-making in the climate change context. Some are familiar from other contexts, such as worries about rent-seeking behavior 94 and free riders. 95 Other concerns are based on the global reality of climate change, the magnitude of which requires international agreement. 96 Once again, however, even with proposals that strive to respect differences in national conditions, 97 it remains true that much of the world's population is not represented by governments or major social and private corporate institutions. Thus, if we are truly to address global climate change, there must be a mechanism established to include these subordinated voices.
B. Towards New Governance Norms: Some Benefits of Listening to Cities and Shantytowns
One might ask what cities would have to add to the climate change debate that is not already known. In the course of considering these benefits, however, it is important also to acknowledge the potential practical diffi- 
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culties of giving city or local voices a greater role in the development of climate change law and policy.
Adding Unheard Voices
Large swaths of the world's cities now exist off the official grid. Often, these areas are effectively off-limits to official authorities. 98 The result is the growth of cities that can resemble more of a collection of city-states in the medieval mold, where security and services are controlled within the community rather than provided across communities 99 than the urbansuburban or regional government and cooperative models more familiar to English-speaking North America and Europe. As a result, the people making the policy and enacting the laws that nominally govern an area within a city in fact have little functional authority over it, much less a notion of how life is lived there. This can only have a negative effect on efforts to apply policy (of whatever kind) to such areas. In the context of climate change, this matters because redesigning our urban environments should be a key goal of climate change response.
As noted at the outset of this Article, for instance, many urban environments are increasingly quite violent.
100 This is hardly surprising, since residents are crammed together with inadequate services, little green space or other recreational areas, few employment opportunities, and, often, poor sanitation. Importantly, these conditions also have consequences for climate change policy. Several examples can be cited that reflect the connection of slum growth and climate change. For example, expanding urban areas, and mostly expansion of unplanned growth by urban migrants, is rapidly eating up precious forests-forests that provide irreplaceable carbon sinks.
101 This is true in countries as different from one another as Bra-
See, e.g., Tranqüilidade e tensão nas fronteiras da cidade partida [Tranquility and tension on the border of the divided city]
, JORNAL DO BRASIL (Braz.), July 27, 2008, at A20 (noting the absence of the state in the shantytowns of Rio de Janeiro, despite their proximity to prosperous neighborhoods).
99. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 17 (reporting that "[i]n the Amazon, one of the world's fastest-growing urban frontiers, 80 percent of city growth has been in shantytowns largely unserved by established utilities and municipal transport").
100. 102 Another example to be cited relates to sanitation. The lack of sanitation has implications for climate changerelated issues as varied as sedimentation in water courses and the water quality of coastlines. 103 However, these problems cannot be solved merely with the imposition of international trading schemes in carbon dioxide or a uniform carbon tax. Specifically, correcting these effects demands an integrated approach that understands urban poverty reduction as a central element in any climate change policy. For example, investments in housing and education might indeed be understood as part of a climate change investment program with both broadly and narrowly focused goals. 104 This should not be understood as essential merely by appeal to a moral interest, as some commentators contend. 105 On the contrary, there is an immediate and pressing interest in violence reduction in urban slums for those both inside and outside of the countries where such violence occurs. This is so in the first instance because of spillover social and environmental effects. 106 For example, the economy of many slums in South America is sustained by drug and, specifically, cocaine traffic, with the demand for those drugs coming principally from Europe and English-speaking North America. 107 Growing coca plants has consequences for agricultural land Thus, one needs to ask, how can green space initiatives, new sanitation systems, or efficient transportation systems-all essential elements of a climate change strategy-be introduced in such areas? One way to begin to address this question would be through the application of a judicial pluralist framework that would attempt to do two things. First, it would recognize the existence of such parallel orders as a first step in bringing disenfranchised voices into the climate change debate. Second, it would seek to accommodate the values and needs reflected in such parallel orders within the larger state. This is not, it should be stressed, to argue that a drug lord in control of a shantytown deserves a seat at the table in international climate change negotiations. However, community voices from disenfranchised urban areas need, somehow, to be systematically integrated into climate change discussions.
Far from being based in abstract moral commitments like Posner's and Sunstein's straw men of distributive or corrective justice, the spillover effects could threaten the well-being of the better-off not only in "developing" countries, but in their more prosperous neighbors as well. Suppose, for example, that Brazil's hot, dry summer of 2006 continued for more than one year-along with the violence that characterized that year. This could ( 111 It could lead to increased migration-both within nations and across borders, with devastating social and environmental effects. 112 In short, it is naïve to suppose that only "many millions of poor people would be hurt by the cost of emissions reductions. . . . [bearing] that cost in the form of higher energy bills, lost jobs, and increased poverty."
113 Poverty may be a problem, as the adage has it, that will always be with us, but to neglect poverty reduction as an essential component of climate change policy would be foolhardy. We can run, but we cannot hide from the disruptions that will result in an ever hotter and more climate-uncertain planet.
Proposals for Infrastructure and Land Reforms: Local Thinking to Aid Global Action
Another way in which cities would introduce an essential voice in climate change discussions would be with respect to infrastructure planning and land reform. As noted earlier, land use is cited as a major climate change sectoral concern.
114 However, as already noted, this typically is understood to refer to agricultural land use, and not the intensive urban land use in which most of the world's population is now engaged worldwide. 115 Cities, however, have much to teach-and much to do-in this respect. For example, urban areas are expanding exponentially, and with them impermeable surfaces that are turning them into heat islands. 116 Cities are also expanding because of deforestation (a consequence of poor planning 
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and/or uncontrolled development), with the resulting loss of vegetative cover and the carbon heat sinks they constitute. 117 Moreover, many of the world's largest cities are coastal and so are especially susceptible to the sea level rise accompanying global warming. 118 However, particularly in the less-developed world, such planning tends to operate in a "depoliticized and technocratic way" that does not involve participation from many of those who will, in theory, be subject to its regulation. 119 Many areas targeted for land use regulation effectively fall outside the official urban grid and are not effectively controlled by the central state. Future climate change-related spatial planning must take this reality into account. Therefore, any sustained effort to introduce the kind of land use and environmental planning necessary to reduce heat islands and similar phenomena must be reformulated to take account of these areas and the views of their residents.
Examples exist of the ordered resolution of social conflicts within even the poorest slums. Take, for example, the huge satellite city of Bogotá, Colombia known as Jerusalem. Jerusalem "is one of the quarters with the highest number of buildings lacking titles in Ciudad Bolívar." 120 Ciudad Bolívar, in turn, is located in the southwest part of the city: Nonetheless, a relatively ordered, concurrent system of property title transfer exists within Jerusalem and owners object to any title "regularization" of the land's inhabitants without compensation. In other countries, the practical problems may differ from this example because extra-legal occupations occur on public and not private land.
123
That fact does not make their resolution less complicated. Nonetheless, this Article suggests that a judicial pluralist model that would recognize the reality of these extra-legal settlements, and the way in which they have ordered land, would constitute an important first step. Doing so would allow the official state to begin to understand the land use challenges faced by these communities. In the context of climate change governance, this could force a discussion about a truly integrated land use plan, one that would seek to identify solutions that recognize extra-legal development patterns. By giving a voice to the residents of such shantytowns and extra-legal settlements, it will be possible to identify solutions that both take account of and seek to respond to their reality. Ultimately, this could lead to difficult discussions, for example, about achieving density or public spending for efficient transportation options. This argument makes no assumption that incorporating such voices will be simple or produce easy-to-achieve solutions. It suggests, however, that in the areas of climate change regulation involving land and resource use, it is essential to hear from those who stand most to be affected.
Immediate objections to such a proposal likely will focus on the fact that the occupations were extra-legal. "These people," it may be said, "have no right to the land and so do not deserve a place at any table on how to use it." At a municipal or other local level, however, any such objection would be rather like insisting that a slang word not be allowed into a dictionary because it is not "real English." Extra-legal occupations have become a defining aspect of global cities and one that has serious implications for land use and thus climate change. They must be recognized, therefore, as a central challenge to be addressed by any climate change policy. At least with respect to land use planning reform, official governments in less developed countries recognize this by way of programs that seek to "regularize" such 
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areas. 124 However, many such programs do not begin from a pluralist perspective but, instead, seek to impose an external order without considering the circumstances and realities of those living in shantytowns and extralegal settlements. 125 Therefore, future climate change policy will need to develop new strategies that both recognize and seek to interact with most of the residents of the world's cities. Part IV of this Article offers a framework to begin to do this. First, however, another benefit of giving voice in climate change governance to unheard city voices can be noted.
Focus on Environmental Justice in Climate Change Governance
Neglecting cities in climate change debates is likely to have the effect of minimizing a deeper understanding of the health consequences of climate change. Specifically, urban areas typically constitute toxic "hot spots," areas where dangerous air and other pollutants are concentrating, with negative effects on their residents. 126 An often-stated concern about the adoption of the most popular climate change solution, namely a carbon trading system, is that it will intensify the growth of such hot spots. 127 It seems FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI only logical then, to avoid undesirable secondary effects of climate change that is globally smart and locally dangerous, that those who stand to be most affected by the expansion of hot spots-namely the global urban poor-be included in the delineation of a global climate policy that can be sustained in the long term.
Another popular economic solution to climate change, specifically a carbon use tax, is similarly problematic because it would be regressive.
128 By virtue of this basic inequality, it makes sense to include those who stand to be disproportionately burdened by the solution to be involved in its application.
Thus, the inclusion of urban voices advanced in this Article would serve the inclusive, participatory goals of the environmental justice movement.
129
A related, additional benefit of doing this would be to forestall the possibility of increased violence in the poor areas of our mega-cities. As noted earlier, the relationship between violence and increased temperatures is a phenomenon that has received strong support in empirical research on the subject. 130 If, along with temperature rise, poor areas also become toxic hotspots and/or suffer regressive carbon taxes that lead to social protest, social and economic chaos is likely to follow.
IV. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION
Given the complicated, pluralistic reality of the world's mega-cities, the challenge is to define the appropriate urban group or groups to participate in climate change governance. One possible means to do so would be through a deliberate, measured application of a pluralist model that seeks to promote participatory, representative democratic governance. The goal will be to ensure that unheard urban voices are incorporated into climate change policy and response.
Promisingly, commentators have begun to propose models that would permit more nuanced responses to climate change governance that would allow recognition of non-nation state, and even local, actors. Hari Osofsky, for example, argues "the farther one moves from the strict Westphalian model" of international law, namely the notion that international order is based upon consent between "sovereign and equal nation-states," the more possible it becomes to allow for different conceptions, notions that do not Judith Resnik and others have argued for according special status to what they call "translocal organizations of government actors," in order, they maintain, to break the horizontal and vertical thinking that dominates the "federalism grid" in thinking about climate change solutions. 133 Others argue that applying international relations theory to the behavior of cities can deepen analyses of "cities' motivation and function as attracting capital or serving as neutral 'markets' or 'bankable' locations" and thus their role in shaping a response to climate change. 134 All of this work has a common dedication to identifying roles for local governments in the shaping of climate change policy. What it lacks, however, is an appreciation that even local governments may not in fact represent the views of many, if not most of their inhabitants.
One opportunity to begin to allow a means to give a meaningful voice to unrepresented urban voices is to structure urban involvement in environmental land management decisions relating to climate change modeled on the successes of participatory budgeting across the world.
The participatory budget:
[I]s an emanation of the theory of participatory democracy, which maintains that citizens must participate directly in political decisions and not merely, as representative democracy would have it, in the choice of political decision makers. It is, therefore, a system of co-governance in which civil society, far from being a haven of survival before an absent or hostile state, is rather a regular and well-organized way of exerting public FORDHAM URB. L.J.
[Vol. XXXVI control over the state by means of institutionalized forms of cooperation and conflict.
135
Declared by the United Nations to be one of the world's forty best urban management programs, 136 the participatory budget first was conducted in the southern Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 1989 and has been a staple of that city's operations ever since. Today it is used throughout cities in Latin America, Spain, France, Italy, Canada, and in two widely different Indian states, Kerala and West Bengal. 137 Although the process is a "very dynamic social and political process," making it difficult "to draw from it many conclusions or projections," the participatory budget "has been a remarkable means of promoting citizen participation in decisions concerning distributive justice, the effectiveness of decisions, and the accountability" of elected political leaders. 138 In other words, participatory budgeting provides an example of democracy emerging from below and not being imposed from above.
If one considers the possible application of the participatory budget in the context of urban climate change governance along these three axes 139 alone, it becomes evident that it offers a promising model for a more inclusive form of climate change governance. Before doing so, however, it is useful to briefly describe the evolution of the participatory budget process in Porto Alegre, Brazil where the idea become a reality.
A. The Example of Participatory Budgeting
To understand the implications and possibilities of a participatory climate change governance model based on the participatory budget model, it is essential to consider the governance traditions against which the idea of the participatory budget reacted as it was originally developed and implemented in southern Brazil. Two principal features of the prevailing modes of Brazilian socio-economic and political life can be observed: an authoritarian political tradition and a deeply unequal society both socially and economically. As de Sousa Santos explains:
Brazil is a society with a long tradition of authoritarian politics. The predominance of an oligarchic, patrimonialist and bureaucratic model of 135 
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OUR BANDIT FUTURE? 245 domination has resulted in a state formation, a political system and culture characterized by the following: political and social marginalization of the popular classes . . . ; restriction of the public sphere and its privatization by the patrimonialist elites; "artificiality" of the democratic game and the liberal ideology resulting in a huge discrepancy between the "legal country" and the "real country". . . . Brazil is also a society characterized by outrageous social inequalities, which have in fact increased tremendously in the past 20 years . . . .
140
As noted in Part I, these authoritarian and unequal traditions lamentably dominate life for millions the world over.
The implementation of the participatory budget in Porto Alegre was no accident. Porto Alegre, Brazil's tenth most-populous city and the capital of the southernmost Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, was an early site of success for the Brazilian Worker's Party, which took power in January 1989 with a commitment to "popular administration."
141
In addition, "[l]ike other Brazilian capitals, in the last decades of the twentieth century Porto Alegre experienced an accelerated process of urbanization," with its population doubling between 1960-1980. 142 Despite the authoritarian and unequal characteristics of Brazilian society, Porto Alegre was especially well positioned for an experiment in participatory politics. Its indices of educational achievement, along with social indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality, were better than the Brazilian norm.
143 In addition, "Porto Alegre is a city of ample democratic traditions, a strong, highly organized civil society" and was a source of resistance during the last military dictatorship, from 1964-1984. 144 The newly elected political leadership focused on the budget when elected to the mayoralty of Porto Alegre, as " [t] In political terms, however, because the executive's [budget] proposal is sanctioned by the institutions of the participatory budget and thus by the citizens and community organizations and associations that participate in them, the executive's proposal becomes a fait accompli for the legislative body in view of the political risks for the deputies in voting against the 'will of the citizens and the communities.'
147
In other words, representative democracy bows to the larger, participatory expression of democratic will.
The participatory budget as first implemented in Porto Alegre was based on three principles: (1) all citizens are entitled to participate as citizens, and community organizations have no special standing (in other words, no greater standing than any individual); (2) participation is governed by a combination of direct and democratic governance rules, and internal rules of functioning are decided by participants; and (3) investment priorities and resource allocation follow both "general" and "technical criteria," where "general criteria" are substantive criteria decided by the participatory institutions and "technical criteria" look to questions of technical or economic viability with reference to federal, state or local legal norms.
148
There are three basic sets of institutions involved in the execution of the participatory budget. First, there are several municipal institutions, the two most important of which are the Planning Office and the Office for Coordinating Relations with Communities. These offices manage the debate with citizens over the participatory budget. 149 Second, community organizations independent of municipal government, somewhat similar to neighborhood planning associations in the United States, "mediate between citizen participation and the choice of priorities for city regions." 150 The third set of institutions responsible for advancing the participatory budget process are "designed to establish a permanent mediation and interaction between the first two kinds. They are regularly functioning institutions of community participation," notably the Counsel of Participatory Budgeting ("COP" in 146 
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OUR BANDIT FUTURE? 247 its Portuguese acronym). 151 The COP and a Forum of Delegates are then charged to pursue the "main goal" of the participatory budget, which "is to encourage a dynamics [sic] and establish a sustained mechanism for joint management of public resources through shared decisions on the allocation of budgetary funds and for governmental accountability concerning the effective implementation of such decisions."
152 A thorough description of the highly articulated structure through which the Forum of Delegates and the COP operate is beyond the scope of this Article. In brief, however, it merits explaining only that both entities subsequently work in the sixteen different regions into which the city was divided for execution of the budget. 153 Within those regions-and sometimes in micro-regions within them, as determined by citizen participants-there are several rounds of plenary assemblies to consider and identify budgeting priorities. 154 Since 1994, there have been six thematic areas. 155 For purposes of this paper, the two most notable such thematic areas are Health and Social Welfare and City Organization, Urban, and Environmental Development. 156 Moreover, these plenaries do not occur without extensive citizens' preparatory meetings, the aim of which "is to collect the demands and claims of individual citizens, grassroots movements, and community institutions, concerning regional or thematic issues; they also initiate community mobilization to select regional delegates." 157 This is not the tidiest of democratic processes, and its structure has evolved over time. For example, there has been regular modification of criteria for delegate selection to the regional forums. 158 The important thing to note is that the changes were made by broad, participatory choice-to repeat: this is democracy emerging from below, and not imposed from above. In this way, the participatory budget seeks to avoid some of the "deliberative challenges"-and specifically the hijacking of popular desires for established interests-that occurs in some efforts to give voice to grassroots concerns. 159 The aim, ultimately, is to identify the three budget priorities for which there is consensus. A process of deliberation in the regional councils, which then gets turned back to the COP and other citizen-focused deliberative assemblies, achieves this. There is much back-and-forth throughout the process between citizens, the executive, and the elected representatives. 160 Throughout, "the executive plays a decisive role." 161 Finally, the expressions of public preference are translated into concrete budget items through a sophisticated system of grading and weighing preferences. This, like so many details of the participatory budget, also changes constantly. 162 As the above description suggests, participatory budgeting is not a problem-free panacea. Challenges include control over information flows; 163 concerns about the autonomy of the COP and other citizen-oriented organs; 164 inadequate representation of women, especially at the higher levels of budgetary decision making; 165 worries about the entrenchment of the representatives of the popular assemblies; 166 and tensions in "relations between popular participation and popular representation." 167 A recurrent challenge concerns the fact that such a participatory democratic model in a representative system effectively creates "a model of co-government, that is to say, a model for sharing political power by means of a network of democratic institutions geared to reaching decisions by deliberation, consensus, and compromise." 168 This can be unwieldy and requires constant oversight and re-thinking. 169 Nonetheless, and despite these ongoing struggles, the process appears to have become more robust over time. A remarkable feature of the participatory budget as applied in Porto Alegre (and subsequently copied widely) is that, despite such conflicts and the growing sophistication of the metrics for measuring popular priorities, not to mention an increasingly complex operational structure, the numbers of people involved in the process grew exponentially.
170 This appears to have been possible only because it:
seeks to articulate measures of participation, on the one hand, with measures of priority and recognized necessity, on the other. The participation measure guarantees the democratic legitimacy of political decisions, whilst the priority and necessity measure guarantees the fidelity, objectivity and transparency of the conversion of political decisions into distributed resources.
171
The process appears to have engendered strong fidelity to its achievements. Indeed, although some members of the city legislature have advocated legalizing the participatory budget. This has not occurred because its participants value the autonomy made possible by the absence of government regulation of the process.
172
The participatory principles described above could equally help refine and sharpen the nature of decisions made through the system of climate change governance. As mentioned at the outset of this section, three standard goals of the participatory budget process would equally be served if this model were applied in the context of climate change governance.
B. Promoting Citizen Participation in Distributive Justice Decisions
This Article has emphasized that much of the world's population is effectively disenfranchised and disconnected from the political and social decision makers who affect their lives. 173 Moreover, as clever critics of climate change resource allocation discussions have noted, the current justifications for distributive justice in the current climate change governance regime are not compelling. 174 However, this might not be so if there were a real possibility for citizens to participate in distributive justice decisions. Were people to understand that decisions were being made that will affect how they use land and what environmental resources are available to them, they would likely engage in those decisions and illuminate justifications for resource distribution.
Where we live, and what is available for all of us to stay alive, are of course questions that affect all of us. These are the kinds of questions that would be implicated by participatory climate change governance. Thus, it is likely that many, if not most, people would be animated by the prospect of engagement in such decisions, just as they have been in Porto Alegre and elsewhere by the opportunity to participate in resource allocations affecting the quality of their urban lives. Moreover, this opportunity for citizen participation could help clarify some of the imperfect incentives described by commentators like Posner and Sunstein-described above as the 171 That is, were citizens involved in the process of making decisions currently performed by their elected or self-appointed representatives, the results might be surprising. Citizens of a "developed" country might well, for instance, express a preference for a progressive carbon tax, or vigorous incentives for behaviors that seek to reduce individual and corporate carbon footprints. 175 Once again, the profusion of local U.S. initiatives seeking to promote aggressive climate change action in the face of federal inaction suggests this might be true. 176 Similarly, it is conceivable that the urban poor in a "developing" country might express a preference for a more restrained growth trajectory if they could first implement a long-term adaptive management strategy to deal with the projected effects of climate change, or even accept the possibility of less income in the short term in return for a gurantee of cleaner air because of, say, a limit on the number of coal burning utility plants.
177
C. Effectiveness of Decisions
It is equally likely that decisions made with respect to climate change policy would be more effective if they were the product of participatory as well as representative decision-making, assuming effectiveness is judged by the implementation of decisions to change behaviors affecting climate change. As many climate change analysts have noted, claims for compensation, not to mention pleas for resource redistribution, are, to say the least, The heaviest carbon emitters, and notably the United States, are reluctant to agree to cap-and-trade systems or a progressive carbon tax on the grounds that such mechanisms would be unfairly prejudicial to their interests. 179 A participatory element in climate change governance could help re-direct that resistance inasmuch as it would force us to scrutinize with greater specificity the wide variety of carbon-emitting behaviors (where and by whom) in both developed and developing countries. Thus, urban participation in climate change governance would uncover a much wider range of opinion about and desire to find solutions for climate change than is the case when the stage is occupied only by representative governments in multilateral and bilateral negotiations.
180
D. Participatory Democracy and the Accountability of Elected Representatives
The participatory budgeting model described for use in climate change governance does not, as explained above, replace popular will for representative governance. 181 On the contrary, as the discussion above outlined, it introduces a participatory voice into representative democracy, producing a new form of co-governance. 182 The advantages of that model as applied in the budgeting context would apply equally in the context of climate change. That is, for instance, a participatory role for the residents of cities would likely increase the accountability of governments. For instance, imagine that, as a result of the participatory budget process in a number of U.S. cities, the U.S. Conference on Mayors announced its preference for a fixed percentage to reduce cli- position on this question to diverge from this stance, surely it would not be sustainable as a political matter, having been endorsed by a broad spectrum of social interests. Suppose similarly that representatives of residents of a group of Indian or Chinese cities were to articulate a comparable position, stating the desire to reduce health care costs for the treatment of respiratory illnesses by limiting the construction of coal-fired utility plants. In this circumstance, it seems equally likely that the popular pressure would alter the official position of the "representative" government. To be sure, there are many niceties of a participatory model as applied to climate change governance that remain to be worked out. While it worked in Porto Alegre, would it work in cities with lower levels of public education and worse human development indicia? How could it be constructed across cultures and political systems to ensure that the executive power does not steal the decision making powers of the population? What is clear is that in climate change governance, a matter that affects the resolution of one of the greatest social, economic, and environmental threats facing us today, new thinking about the best means to effect climate change policy is essential. As James Gustave Speth, the former administrator of the United Nations Development Program, recently observed:
It is no accident that environmental crisis is gathering as social injustice is deepening and growing inequality is impairing democratic institutions. Each is the result of a system of political economy-today's capitalismthat is profoundly committed to profits and growth and profoundly indifferent to nature and society . . . . The best hope for change in America is a fusion of those concerned about the environment, social justice and strong democracy into one powerful progressive force. 183 Speth might have said that this is the best hope not noly for "America," but also for the globe. As this Article has endeavored to show, the nature and future prospects of the world's mega-cities, without the possibility of a participatory role for their largely unheard residents, will only negatively compound the already severe consequences we face because of anthropogenic climate change. Participatory climate change governance provides one way to create the kind of progressive fusion that we desperately need, in the United States and beyond its borders.
